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The BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) combined with decoy-state method is currently the
most practical protocol, which has been proved secure against general attacks in the finite-key
regime. Thereinto, statistical fluctuation analysis methods are very important in dealing with finite-
key effects, which directly affect secret key rate, secure transmission distance and even the most
important security. There are two tasks of statistical fluctuation in decoy-state BB84 QKD. One
is the deviation between expected value and observed value for a given expected value or observed
value. The other is the deviation between phase error rate of computational basis and bit error rate
of dual basis. Here, we provide the rigorous and optimal analytic formula to solve the above tasks,
resulting higher secret key rate and longer secure transmission distance. Our results can be widely
applied to deal with statistical fluctuation in quantum cryptography protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
So far, there have existed many kinds of protocols
describing how quantum key distribution (QKD) work,
such as the Bennett-Brassard-1984 (BB84) [1], Bennett-
Brassard-Mermin-1992 [2], Bennett-1992 [3], and six-
state [4] protocols. Although different protocols contains
different processes, they all serve the same purpose to
guarantee that two parties, named Alice and Bob, can
share a string of key data through a channel fully con-
trolled by an eavesdropper, named Eve [1]. Unlike
some computational assumptions, these protocols are all
proven to be secure with fundamental physical laws in
the recent years [5–11], which shows the great advan-
tage in information transmitting that QKD holds. BB84
stands out as the most important protocol due to its best
overall performance. However, implementations of the
BB84 protocol differ from the original theoretical pro-
posal. For an ideal single-photon source is not available
yet, in actuality, a weak pulsed laser source is in place of
it. Nevertheless, there is a critical flaw in the weak pulsed
laser source that an non-negligible part of laser pulses
contains more than one photon, which will be exploited
by Eve through the photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tack [12]. To address this drawback with high channel
loss, the decoy-state method is introduced [13–15].
The source will generate the phase-randomized coher-
ent state in decoy-state method, which can be regarded
as the mixed photon number state. The essence of the
decoy state idea can be summarized as that the yield
(bit error rate) of n-photon in signal state is equal to
that in decoy state. However, this equal-yield condition
can only be established under the asymptotic-key regime.
The expected value of yield (bit error rate) of n-photon
in signal state and decoy state are identical while the cor-
responding observed value cannot be assumed to be the
same in the finite-key regime. By exploiting the decoy-
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state method, one can establish the linear system of equa-
tions about the expected values to obtain expected value
of yield (bit error rate) of the single-photon component,
where we need estimate the expected value of some pa-
rameters given by the known observed values. Actually,
the observed value of yield (bit error rate) of the single-
photon component in the key extraction data is what we
really need, where we must estimate the observed value
given by the known expected value.
The Gaussian analysis method [16] is first proposed
to deal with the the deviation between expected value
and observed value given by the known observed value.
The Gaussian analysis method is not rigorous because
of the identically distributed assumption, which can only
valid in the collective attack. Resulting the extracted se-
cret key cannot be secure against the coherent attack.
Recently, the multiplicative form Chernoff bound [17]
and Hoeffding inequality [18] methods are proposed to
remove the identically distributed assumption, respec-
tively. However, there is a considerable gap between the
secret key rate bounds obtained from Chernoff-Hoeffding
method and that obtained from the Gaussian analysis.
In order to close this gap, the inverse solution Cher-
noff bound method [19] is presented, which achieves a
similar performance with Gaussian analysis. Here, we
should point out that the inverse solution Chernoff bound
method is also seem to be not rigorous. An important as-
sumption in Chernoff bound is that one should have the
prior knowledge of expected value. However, the prob-
lem that we have in hand is the opposite that we need to
estimate expected value for a given observed value. This
is why the multiplicative form Chernoff bound is some-
how complex and carefully tailored. A direct criterion is
that the lower bound result of inverse solution Chernoff
bound is superior to the Gaussian analysis when one has
a small observed value. Note that the result of Gaus-
sian analysis should be optimal because the identically
distributed assumption is a special case.
For BB84 protocol, one need bound the the conditional
smooth min-entropy [20], which relates to the phase er-
ror rate. The phase error rate cannot be directly ob-
served, which can only be estimated by using the ran-
2dom sampling without replacement theory for security
against the general attacks. A hypergeometric distribu-
tion method [21] is first proposed to deal with the devia-
tion between phase error rate of computational basis and
bit error rate of dual basis in the finite-key regime. By
using the inequality scaling technique, a numerical equa-
tion solution by using Shannon entropy function [21] is
acquired to estimate the phase error rate. Based on this,
an analytical solution is obtained when the data size is
large [18]. A looser analytical solution is using the Ser-
fling inequality [17]. By exploiting the Ahrens map for
Hypergeometric distribution, one uses Clopper-Pearson
confidence interval [22] replace the Serfling inequality.
Recently, a specifically tailored analytical solution is ac-
quired [23], which achieves a big advantage compared to
Serfling inequality. Here, we should point out that the
specifically tailored analytical solution [23] for random
sampling without replacement is incorrect. The inequal-
ity scaling of binomial coefficient and Eq. (11) in supple-
mentary information of Ref. [23] is wrong.
In order to further improve the secret key rate in the
case of high-loss, some authors of us have developed the
tightest method to solve the above two tasks of statisti-
cal fluctuation [24]. Thereinto, the numerical equation of
Chernoff bound is used to estimate the observed value for
a given expected value. A numerical equation of Cher-
noff bound’s variant is exploited to obtain the expected
value for a given observed value. A numerical equation
relating to the hypergeometric distribution is directly ap-
plied to acquire the phase error rate for a given bit error
rate. These numerical equation solutions are very tight
but they are very inconvenient to use. On the one hand,
it will be very time consuming if we optimize the system
parameters globally by solving transcendental equations.
On the other hand, it is a challenge to solve transcenden-
tal equations for each time post-processing in commercial
QKD system with hardware. In this work we present
the optimal analytical formulas to solve the two tasks
of statistical fluctuation by using the rigorous inequality
scaling technique. Furthermore, we establish the com-
plete finite-key analysis for decoy-state BB84 QKD with
composable security. The simulation results show that
the secret key rate and secure transmission distance of
our method have a significant advantage compared with
previous rigorous methods.
II. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we let x∗ be the expected value, x be the
observed value, x and x be the lower and upper bound of
x. Here, we first introduce the numerical equation result
of Ref. [24]. Then we present the tight analytical for-
mulas by using the rigorous inequality scaling technique,
which are the slightly looser bounds than those obtained
by solving equations.
FIG. 1. Comparison of the random sampling without replace-
ment for five methods: our analytic result, analytic result with
Serfling inequality [17], approximate analytic result [18], nu-
merical result with Shannon entropy function [19] and optimal
numerical result with binomial coefficient [24]. Let n = 105
and failure probablity ǫ = 10−10.
A. Random Sampling Without Replacement
Random sampling without replacement.—Let Xn+k:=
{x1, x2, ..., xn+k} be a string of binary bits with n + k
size, in which the number of bits value is unknown. Let
Xk be a random sample (without replacement) bit string
with k size from Xn+k. Let λ be the probability of bit
value 1 observed in Xk. Let Xn be the remaining bit
string, where the probability of bit value 1 observed in
Xn is χ. Then, in this article, we let C
j
i =
i!
j!(i−j)! be the
binomial coefficient. For any ǫ > 0, we have the upper
tail Pr[χ ≥ λ + γU ] ≤ ǫ, where we use γU represents
γU (n, k, λ, ǫ) and γU is the positive root of the following
equation [24]
lnCkλk + lnC
n(λ+γU )
n − lnC(n+k)λ+nγ
U
n+k = ln ǫ. (1)
Calculating Eq. (1), we get numerical results of γU ,
corresponding to the upper bound of the random sam-
pling without replacement. Solving transcendental equa-
tion Eq. (1) is usually very complicated. Here, we are
going to make use of some techniques mathematically
to get rigorous tight analytical result. Details proof
can be found in Appendix A. For the upper tail, let
0 < λ < χ ≤ 0.5, we have the analytical result
γU =
(1−2λ)AG
n+k +
√
A2G2
(n+k)2 + 4λ(1− λ)G
2 + 2 A
2G
(n+k)2
, (2)
where A = max{n, k} and G = n+knk ln n+k2πnkλ(1−λ)ǫ2 .
Therefore, the upper bound of χ can be given by χ =
λ + γU with a failure probability ǫ. Fig. 1 shows the
comparison results between our method and previous
method [17–19, 24], which means that our analytic re-
sult is optimal and closes to the numerical results.
3B. Deviation Between Expected and Observed
Values
1. For a given expected value
Chernoff bound.—Let X1, X2..., XN be a set of inde-
pendent Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi =
1) = pi (not necessarily equal), and let X :=
∑N
i=1Xi.
The expected value of X is denoted as x∗ := E[X ] =∑N
i=1 pi. An observed value of X is represented as x for
a given trial. Note that, we have x ≥ 0, x∗ ≥ 0, x∗ is
known and x is unknown. For any ǫ > 0, we have the
upper tail Pr[x ≥ (1 + δU )x∗] ≤ ǫ, where we use δU rep-
resents δU (x∗, ǫ) and δU > 0 is the positive root of the
following equation [24]
x∗[δU − (1 + δU ) ln(1 + δU )] = ln ǫ. (3)
For any ǫ > 0, we have the lower tail Pr[x ≤ (1−δL)x∗] ≤
ǫ, where we use δL represents δL(x∗, ǫ) and 0 < δL ≤ 1
is the positive root of the following equation [24]
−x∗[δL + (1− δL) ln(1− δL)] = ln ǫ. (4)
By solving Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), we get numerical results
of δU and δL, corresponding to the upper bound and
lower bound. Solving transcendental equations Eq. (3)
and Eq. (4) are usually very complicated. For the upper
tail, by using the inequality ln(1 + δU ) > 2δU/(2 + δU )
in Eq. (3), we have the analytical result
δU =
β +
√
8βx∗ + β2
2x∗
, (5)
where we let β = ln ǫ−1. For the lower tail, by using
the inequality − ln(1 − δL) < δL(2 − δL)/[2(1 − δL)] in
Eq. (4), we have the analytical result
δL =
√
2β
x∗
. (6)
Therefore, the lower and upper bound of observed
value x for a given expected value x∗ can be given by
x = x∗ + β2 +
√
2βx∗ + β
2
4 and x = x
∗ − √2βx∗ with
a failure probability ǫ, respectively. Note that we must
have the lower bound x ≥ 0. The analytic result of up-
per bound in Eq. (5) is also acquired in Ref. [19] while
we obtain more optimal lower bound in Eq. (6).
2. For a given observed value
Variant of Chernoff bound.—Let X1, X2..., XN be a
set of independent Bernoulli random variables that sat-
isfy Pr(Xi = 1) = pi (not necessarily equal), and let
X :=
∑N
i=1Xi. The expected value of X is denoted as
x∗ := E[X ] =
∑N
i=1 pi. An observed outcome of X is
represented as x for a given trial. Note that, we have
FIG. 2. Comparison of the lower bound of expected value
given a observed value for five methods: our analytic result,
numerical result of Ref. [24], Gaussian analysis, numerical
result and analytic result of Ref. [19].
x ≥ 0, x∗ ≥ 0, x is known and x∗ is unknown. For any
ǫ > 0, we have the upper tail Pr[x∗ ≤ x+∆U ], where we
use ∆U represents ∆U (x, ǫ) and ∆U is the positive root
of the following equation [24]
−∆U + x ln x+∆
U
x
= ln ǫ. (7)
For any ǫ > 0, we have the upper tail Pr[x∗ ≥ x +∆L],
where we use ∆L represents ∆L(x, ǫ) and ∆L is the pos-
itive root of the following equation [24]
∆L − (x +∆L) ln x+∆
L
x
= ln ǫ. (8)
By solving Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), we get numerical re-
sults of ∆U and ∆L, corresponding to the upper bound
and lower bound. Solving transcendental equations
Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) are usually very complicated. For
the upper tail, by using the inequality ln
(
1 + ∆
U
x
)
<
∆U
x
(
2 + ∆
U
x
)
/
[
2
(
1 + ∆
U
x
)]
in Eq. (7), we have the an-
alytical result
∆U = β +
√
2βx+ β2. (9)
For the lower tail, by using the inequality ln
(
1 + ∆
L
x
)
>
2∆
L
x /
(
2 + ∆
L
x
)
in Eq. (8), we have the analytical result
∆L =
β
2
+
√
2βx+
β2
4
. (10)
Therefore, the lower and upper bound of expected
value x∗ for a given observed value x can be given by
x∗ = x + β +
√
2βx+ β2 and x∗ = x − β2 −
√
2βx+ β
2
4
with a failure probability ǫ, respectively. Note that we
must have the lower bound x∗ ≥ 0. Utilizing a simple
function transformation, the numerical result of upper
4bound x∗ with Eq. (7) is the same as (Eq. (B7) in this
paper) in Ref. [19], while the analytic result of upper
bound is more optimal in this work. The numerical re-
sult of lower bound x∗ with Eq. (8) is different from in
Ref. [19], and the difference between two analytic results
of lower bound is only β. However, we should point out
that our result is always inferior to the Gaussian analy-
sis, while the result of Ref. [19] is superior to the Gaus-
sian analysis given a small observed value, details can be
found in Fig. 2. It means that our result is rigorous while
that of Ref. [19] is not. The case of small observed value
is very important since the vacuum state is widely used
in decoy-state method, especially for the experiment of
measurement-device-independent QKD [25].
III. FINITE-KEY ANALYSIS FOR
DECOY-STATE BB84 QKD
In this section, we exploit our statistical fluctuation
analysis methods to deal with finite-key effects with com-
posable security for the case of BB84 QKD with two
decoy states. Compared with previous results [17–19],
we provide the complete extractable secret key formula.
For example, the number of vacuum component events,
the number of single-photon component events, and the
phase error rate associated with the single-photons com-
ponent events are all required to use observed values in
the extractable secret key formula, while all or part of
them are taken as the expected values in Ref. [17–19].
Obviously, they are observed values, for instance, the
QKD system with single-photon source [20].
A. Protocol description
The asymmetric coding BB84 protocol, based on
which we consider our protocol, means that the bases Z
and X are chosen with biased probabilities, both when
Alice prepare the quantum states and when Bob measure
those states. Furthermore, intended to simplifying the
protocol a little, we let the secret key be extracted
only if Alice and Bob both choose the Z basis. Also,
for the same purpose, the protocol will be built on
the transmission of phase-randomized laser pulses and
makes use of vacuum and weak decoy states. Below we
provide a detailed description of the protocol with active
basis choosing.
1. Preparation. The first three steps are repeated by
Alice and Bob for i = 1, . . . , N until the conditions in
the reconciliation step are satisfied. Alice will prepare
weak coherent pulse and encode under the {Z,X} basis,
along with an intensity k ∈ {µ, ν, 0}. Let the probability
of choosing Z and X basis be pz and px = 1 − pz.
Simultaneously, the probabilities of selecting intensities
are pµ, pν and p0 = 1 − pµ − pν , respectively. Then
Alice sends the weak coherent pulse to Bob through the
insecure quantum channel.
2. Measurement. When receiving the pulse, Bob also
chooses a basis Z and X with probabilities qz and
qx = 1 − qz, respectively. Then, he measures the state
with two single-photon detectors in that basis. An
effective event represents at least one detector click. For
double detector click event, he acquires a random bit
value.
3. Reconciliation. Alice and Bob share the effective
event, basis and intensity information with each other
using an authenticated classical channel. We use the
following sets Zk (Xk), which identifies signals where
both Alice and Bob select the basis Z (X) for k intensity.
Then, they check for |Zk| ≥ nZk and |Xk| ≥ nXk for
all values of k. They repeat step 1 to step 3 un-
til these conditions are satisfied. We remark that the
vacuum state prepared by Alice has no basis information.
4. Parameter estimation. After reconciling the basis
and intensity choices, Alice and Bob will select a size
of nZ = nZµ + n
Z
ν to get a raw key pair (ZA,ZB). All
sets are used to compute the number of vacuum events
sZ0 and single-photon events s
Z
1 and the phase error
rate of single-photon events φZ1 in ZA. After that,
a condition should be met that the phase error rate
φZ1 is less than φtol, where φtol is a predetermined
phase error rate. If not, Alice and Bob abort the results
and get started again. Otherwise, they move on to step 5.
5. Postprocessing. First, Alice and Bob operate an
error correction, where they reveal at most λEC bits
of information. Then, an error-verification step is
performed using a random universal2 hash function that
announces ⌈log2 1εcor ⌉ bits of information [26], where εcor
is the probability that a pair of nonidentical keys passes
the error-verification step. At last, there is a privacy
amplification on their keys to get a secret key pair
(SA,SB), both of which are ℓ bits, by using a random
universal2 hash function.
B. Security bounds
Before stating how to calculate the security bound,
we will spell out our security criteria, i.e., the so-called
universally composable framework [27]. We have two
criteria (εcor and εsec) to determine how secure of our
protocol. If Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ εcor, which means the
secret keys are identical except with a small probabil-
ity εcor, we can call it is εcor-correct. Meanwhile, if
(1 − pabort)‖ρAE − UA ⊗ ρE‖1/2 ≤ εsec, we can call it
is εsec-secret. Thereinto, ρAE is the classical-quantum
state describing the joint state of SA and E, UA is the
uniform mixture of all possible values of SA, and pabort
is the probability that the protocol aborts. This secu-
5rity criterion guarantees that the pair of secret keys can
be unconditionally safe to use, we can call the proto-
col is ε-secure if it is εcor-correct and εsec-secret with
εcor + εsec ≤ ε.
The protocol is εsec-secret if the secret key of length ℓ
satisfies
ℓ =sZ0 + s
Z
1
[
1− h
(
φ
Z
1
)]
− λEC − log2
2
εcor
− 6 log2
23
εsec
,
(11)
where h(x) := −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the bi-
nary Shannon entropy function. Note that observed val-
ues sZ0 , s
Z
1 and φ
Z
1 are the lower bound for the number
of vacuum events, the lower bound for the number of
single-photon events, and the upper bound for the phase
error rate associated with the single-photons events in
ZA, respectively. Here, we simply assume an error cor-
rection leakage λEC = n
Zζh(EZ), with the efficiency of
error correction ζ = 1.22 and the bit error rate EZ in
(ZA,ZB).
Let nZk and n
X
k are the observed number of bit in set
Zk and Xk. Let mZk and mXk denote the observed number
of bit error in set Zk and Xk. Note that one cannot
obtain the mZµ and m
Z
ν , which we just hypothetically use
to estimate the error correction information. The bit
error rate is EZ = (mZµ +m
Z
ν)/n
Z. By using the decoy-
state method for finite sample sizes, we can have the
lower bound on the expected numbers of vacuum event
sZ
∗
0 and single-photon event s
Z
∗
1 in ZA,
sZ
∗
0 ≥(e−µpµ + e−νpν)
nZ
∗
0
p0
,
sZ
∗
1 ≥
µ2e−µpµ + µνe−νpν
µν − ν2
×
(
eν
nZ
∗
ν
pν
− ν
2
µ2
eµ
nZ
∗
µ
pµ
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
nZ
∗
0
p0
)
,
(12)
where nZ
∗
0 and n
Z
∗
ν (n
Z
∗
µ and n
Z
∗
0 ) are the lower (upper)
bound of expected values associated with the observed
values nZ0 and n
Z
ν (n
Z
µ and n
Z
0). We can also calculate the
lower bound on the expected number of single-photon
event sX
∗
1 and the upper bound on the expected number
of bit error tX
∗
1 associated with the single-photon event
in Xµ ∪ Xν ,
sX
∗
1 ≥
µ2e−µpµ + µνe−νpν
µν − ν2
×
(
eν
nX
∗
ν
pν
− ν
2
µ2
eµ
nX
∗
µ
pµ
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
nX
∗
0
p0
)
,
t
X
∗
1 ≤
µe−µpµ + νe−νpν
ν
(
eν
mX
∗
ν
pν
− n
X
∗
0
2p0
)
,
(13)
where we use a fact that expected value mX
∗
0 ≡ nX
∗
0 /2.
Parameters nX
∗
0 and n
X
∗
ν (n
X
∗
µ , n
X
∗
0 and m
X
∗
ν ) are the
lower (upper) bound of expected values associated with
the observed values nX0 and n
X
ν (n
X
µ, n
X
0 and m
X
ν ). The
nine expected values nZ
∗
0 , n
Z
∗
ν , n
Z
∗
µ , n
Z
∗
0 , n
X
∗
0 , n
X
∗
ν , n
X
∗
µ ,
nX
∗
0 and m
X
∗
ν can be obtained by using the variant of
Chernoff bound with Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) for each pa-
rameter with failure probability εsec/23, for example,
nZ
∗
ν = n
Z
ν −∆L(nZν , εsec/23).
Once acquiring the four expected values sZ
∗
0 , s
Z
∗
1 ,
sX
∗
1 and t
X
∗
1 , one can exploit the Chernoff bound with
Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) to calculate the corresponding ob-
served values sZ0 , s
Z
1 , s
X
1 and t
X
1 for each parameter with
failure probability εsec/23, for example, s
Z
1 = s
Z
∗
1 (1 −
δL(sZ
∗
1 , εsec/23)). By using the random sampling with-
out replacement with Eq. (2), one can calculate the upper
bound of hypothetically observed phase error rate asso-
ciated with the single-photon events in ZA,
φ
Z
1 =
t
X
1
sX1
+ γU
(
sZ1 , s
X
1 ,
t
X
1
sX1
,
εsec
23
)
. (14)
C. Simulation
In order to show the performance of our method in
terms of the secret key rate and the secure transmission
distance, we consider a fiber-based QKD system model
with active basis choosing measurement. We use the
widely used parameters of a practical QKD system [28],
as listed in Table I. For a given experiment, one can di-
rectly acquire the parameters nZk, n
X
k , m
Z
k and m
X
k . For
simulation, we can use the formulas nZk = NpkpzqzQ
Z
k,
nXk = NpkpxqxQ
X
k , m
Z
k = NpkpzqzE
Z
kQ
Z
k and m
X
k =
NpkpxqxE
X
kQ
X
k , where Q
Z
k and Q
X
k are the gain of Z and
X basis when Alice chooses optical pulses with intensity
k. For vacuum state without basis information, we can
reset nZ0 = Np0qzQ
Z
0 , n
X
0 = Np0qxQ
X
0 , m
Z
0 = Np0qzE
Z
0Q
Z
0
andmX0 = Np0qxE
X
0Q
X
0 . E
Z
k and E
X
k are the bit error rate
of Z and X basis when Alice chooses optical pulses with
intensity k. Without loss of generality, these gain and bit
error rate parameters can be given by [16]
QZk = Q
X
k = 1− (1− Y0)e−kη,
EZkQ
Z
k = E
X
kQ
X
k = edQ
Z
k + (e0 − ed)Y0,
(15)
where we assume that those observed values for differ-
ent parameters can be denotes by their asymptotic val-
ues without Eve’s disturbance. η = ηd × 10−αL/10 is
the overall efficiency with the fiber length L and single-
photon detector.
To show the advantage of our results compared with
previous works [17–19], we drew the curves about the se-
cret key rate ℓ/N as function of the fiber length, as shown
in Fig. 3. For a given number of signals 1010, only ten
seconds in 1 GHz system, we optimize numerically ℓ/N
over all the free parameters. For fair comparison, we add
a step about from expected value to observed value esti-
mation for all curves, which is not taken into account in
6TABLE I. List of simulation parameters. ηd is the detection
efficiency of single-photon detector, ζ is the efficiency of er-
ror correction, α is the attenuation coefficient of single-mode
fiber, ed is the misalignment rate, and N is the number of
optical pulses sent by Alice.
ηd Y0 ed α ζ εsec εcor N
4.5% 1.7 × 10−6 3.3% 0.21 dB/km 1.22 10−10 10−15 1010
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140
Fiber length(km)
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
Se
cr
et
 k
ey
 ra
te
 p
er
 p
ul
se
This work
Ref.[18]
Ref.[17]
Ref.[19] with Gaussian
FIG. 3. The secret key rate vs fiber length. It shows
the comparison of the secret key rates of different statistical
fluctuation methods. Numerically optimized secret key rates
with logarithmic scale are obtained for a predetermined sig-
nals N = 1010.
Refs. [17, 18]. The corresponding methods of Refs. [16–
19] to deal with statistical fluctuation can be summarized
in Appendix B. Note that the black dashed line uses the
Gaussian analysis to obtain expected value instead of the
inverse solution Chernoff bound method [19]. The sim-
ulation results show that the secret key rate and secure
transmission distance of our method have significant ad-
vantage under the security against the general attacks.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed the almost optimal analyt-
ical formulas to deal with the statistical fluctuation un-
der the security against the general attacks. Analytical
formulas of classical postprocessing can be expediently
used in practical system, which do not introduce complex
calculations of resource consumption. Our methods can
directly increase the performance without changing the
quantum process, which should be widely used to quan-
tum cryptography protocols against the finite-size effects.
In order to compare with previous works, we establish the
complete finite-key analysis for decoy-state BB84 QKD,
including from observed value to expected value, from ex-
pected value to observed value and from the observed bit
error of X basis to hypothetical observed phase error of Z
basis. We remark that the joint constraint method [29]
can further decrease the statistical fluctuation. However,
we do not consider this issue in this paper due to without
the analytical solutions, which is difficult to implement
in commercial systems.
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Appendix A: Proof of random sampling without
replacement
Proof. Here, we use the technique of Ref. [23] to ac-
quire the correct analytical results. We remark that the
result of Ref. [23] is wrong due to the incorrect inequal-
ity scaling about binomial coefficient and Eq. (11) in
supplementary information of Ref. [23]. For the upper
tail, the failure probability ǫ can be bound by [21, 23, 24]
Ckλk C
nχ
n /C
(n+k)y
n+k , where y = λ+
n
n+kγ and χ = λ+γ. Let
F (α, n) = α
−αn(1−α)−(1−α)n√
2πnα(1−α) and using the sharp double
inequality for binomial coefficient [30]
e−
1
8αnF (α, n) < Cαnn < e
( 112n− 112nα+1− 112n(1−α)+1 )F (α, n),
(A1)
we can give the following inequality for failure probability
Ckλk C
nχ
n
C
(n+k)y
n+k
<
eln 2·[nh(χ)+kh(λ)−(n+k)h(y)]√
2πnkλ(1− λ)/(n+ k)
√
y(1− y)
χ(1− χ)
× e( 18(n+k)y+ 112k− 112kλ+1− 112k(1−λ)+1 )
× e( 112n− 112nχ+1− 112n(1−χ)+1 ),
(A2)
where Shannon entropy function h(x) = −x log2 x −
(1 − x) log2(1 − x). Note that one can prove
e(
1
8(n+k)y
+ 112k− 112kλ+1− 112k(1−λ)+1+ 112n− 112nχ+1− 112n(1−χ)+1 ) <
1 and
√
y(1−y)
χ(1−χ) < 1 for n, k > 0 and 0 < λ < y < χ ≤ 0.5.
Thereby, the inequality can be given by
Ckλk C
nχ
n
C
(n+k)y
n+k
<
eln 2·[nh(χ)+kh(λ)−(n+k)h(y)]√
2πnkλ(1− λ)/(n+ k) . (A3)
By using Taylor expanding for the case of n ≥ k, we
have nh(χ) + kh(λ) − (n + k)h(y) ≤ h′′(y)2 γ
2nk
n+k , where
h′′(y) = − 1y(1−y) ln 2 . Therefore, by solving a quadratic
equation with one unknown, we have
γ =
(1−2λ)nG
n+k +
√
n2G2
(n+k)2 + 4λ(1− λ)G
2 + 2 n
2G
(n+k)2
, (A4)
7where parameterG = n+knk ln
n+k
2πnkλ(1−λ)ǫ2 . By using Tay-
lor expanding for the case of n ≤ k, we have the follow-
ing inequalities nh(χ) + kh(λ) − (n + k)h(y) ≤ nh(λ) +
kh(χ)−(n+k)h(z) ≤ h′′(z)2 γ
2nk
n+k where z = λ+
k
n+kγ and
h′′(z) = − 1z(1−z) ln 2 . Therefore, by solving a quadratic
equation with one unknown, we have
γ =
(1−2λ)kG
n+k +
√
k2G2
(n+k)2 + 4λ(1− λ)G
2 + 2 k
2G
(n+k)2
. (A5)
Note that the above result is always true for all n, k > 0
and 0 < λ < χ ≤ 0.5.
Appendix B: Previous methods
In this section, we summarize the statistical fluctuation
method used previously as follows.
1. Method in Ref. [17]
The upper bound of the random sampling without re-
placement can be calculated by using the Serfling inequal-
ity,
γU =
√
(n+ k)(k + 1)
nk2
ln ǫ−1. (B1)
The upper bound and lower bound of expected value
for a given observed value can be calculated by us-
ing the multiplicative form Chernoff bound as follows.
We always can obtain the worst lower bound of ex-
pected value, µL = x −
√
N/2 ln ǫ−1, where N is the
total number of random variables. Let test1, test2 and
test3 denote, respectively, the following three conditions:
µL ≥ 329 ln(2ǫ−11 ), µL > 3 ln ǫ−12 and µL >
(
2
2e−1
)2
ln ǫ−12 ,
and let g(x, y) =
√
2x ln y−1. Now:
1. When test1 and test2 are fulfilled, we have that
∆U = g(x, ǫ41/16) and ∆
L = g(x, ǫ
3/2
2 ).
2. When test1 and test3 are fulfilled (and test2 is not
fulfilled), we have that ∆U = g(x, ǫ41/16) and ∆
L =
g(x, ǫ22).
3. When test1 is fulfilled and test3 is not fulfilled,
we have that ∆U = g(x, ǫ41/16) and ∆
L =√
N/2 ln ǫ−12 .
4. When test1 is not fulfilled and test2 is fulfilled, we
have that ∆U =
√
N/2 ln ǫ−11 and ∆
L = g(x, ǫ
3/2
2 ).
5. When test1 and test2 are not fulfilled, and test3
is fulfilled, we have that ∆U =
√
N/2 ln ǫ−11 and
∆L = g(x, ǫ22).
6. When test1, test2 and test3 are not fulfilled,
we have that ∆U =
√
N/2 ln ǫ−11 and ∆
L =√
N/2 ln ǫ−12
To simplify this simulation, we consider the case of ǫ =
ǫ1 = ǫ2. For all observed value x, we make x
∗ = x+∆U
and x∗ = x−∆L, where
∆U =
√
8βx+ 8x ln 2,
∆L =
√
3βx.
(B2)
Note that it is not rigorous in Eq. (B2) for small x.
2. Method in Ref. [18]
The upper bound of the random sampling without re-
placement can be calculated by
γU =
√
(n+ k)λ(1 − λ)
nk ln 2
log2
n+ k
nkλ(1− λ)ǫ2 , (B3)
where the result is true only when n and k are large.
The upper bound and lower bound of expected value
for a given observed value can be calculated by using the
tailored Hoeffding inequality for decoy-state method. Let
xk be the observed value for k intensity and X =
∑
k xk.
Therefore, we have x∗k = xk + ∆
U and x∗k = xk − ∆L,
where
∆U = ∆L =
√
X/2 ln ǫ−1. (B4)
Note that the deviation is the same for all intensities of
k, which will lead large fluctuation for small intensity,
especially vacuum state.
3. Method in Ref. [19]
The upper bound of the random sampling without re-
placement can be calculated by using the following tran-
scendental equation,
h
(
λ+
n
n+ k
γU
)
− k
n+ k
h(λ)− n
n+ k
h(λ+ γU )
=
1
2(n+ k)
log2
n+ k
nkλ(1− λ)ǫ2 .
(B5)
The upper bound and lower bound of expected value
for a given observed value can be calculated by using the
Gaussian analysis. Therefore, we have x∗ = x+∆U and
x∗ = x−∆L with
∆U = ∆L = erfcinv(2ǫ)
√
2x, (B6)
where a = erfcinv(b) is the inverse function of b = erfc(a)
and erfc(a) = 2√
π
∫∞
a e
−t2dt is the complementary error
8Furthermore, the upper bound and lower bound of ex-
pected value for a given observed value can also be cal-
culated by using the inverse solution Chernoff bound.
Therefore, we have x∗ = x/(1−δU ) and x∗ = x/(1+δL),
where δU and δL can be obtained by using the following
transcendental equation,
x
1− δU [−δ
U − (1− δU ) ln(1− δU )] = ln ǫ,
x
1 + δL
[δL − (1 + δL) ln(1 + δL)] = ln ǫ,
(B7)
while the slightly looser analytic result can be given by
δU =
√
8βx+ 9β2 − β
2(x+ β)
, (B8)
and
δL =
√
8βx+ β2 + 3β
2(x− β) . (B9)
Through simple calculation, the upper bound and lower
bound are x∗ = x+ 32β+
√
2βx+ 94β
2 and x∗ = x+ β2 −√
2βx+ β
2
4 , respectively.
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